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Introduction: The concept of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), along with synonymous or closely related
terms like indigenous knowledge and native science, has some of its origins in literatures on international
development and adaptive management. There is a tendency to want to determine one definition for TEK that can
satisfy every stakeholder in every situation. Yet a scan of environmental science and policy literatures reveals there
to be differences in definitions that make it difficult to form a consensus. What should be explored instead is the
role that the concept of TEK plays in facilitating or discouraging cross-cultural and cross-situational collaboration
among actors working for indigenous and non-indigenous institutions of environmental governance, such as tribal
natural resources departments, federal agencies working with tribes, and co-management boards.
Methods: This is a philosophical paper that explores how the concept of TEK is defined in science and policy
literatures and what purpose it serves for improving cooperative environmental and natural resources stewardship
and management between indigenous and non-indigenous institutions. The philosophical method applied here is
one that outlines numerous possible meanings of a concept (TEK, in this paper) and the implications of each
meaning for science and policy.
Results: In science and policy literatures, there are different definitions of TEK. Controversy can brew over TEK when
people hold definitions that are based on different assumptions. There are two kinds of assumptions about the
meaning of TEK. The first kind refers to assumptions about the mobilization of TEK, or what I call knowledge
mobilization. The second kind involves assumptions about how to understand the relationship between TEK and
disciplines like ecology or biology, or, in other words, the relation between TEK and science. Different positions that
fall under the two kinds of assumptions (knowledge mobilization; TEK and science) can generate disagreements
because they imply differences about “whose” definition of TEK gets privileged, who is counted as having expert
authority over environmental governance issues, and how TEK should be factored into policy processes that already
have a role for disciplines like forestry or toxicology in them.
Conclusions: In light such disagreements, I argue that the concept of TEK should be understood as a collaborative
concept. It serves to invite diverse populations to continually learn from one another about how each approaches
the very question of “knowledge” in the first place, and how these different approaches can be blended to better
steward natural resources and adapt to climate change. The implication is that environmental scientists and policy
professionals, indigenous and non-indigenous, should not be in the business of creating definitions of TEK. Instead,
they should focus more on creating long term processes that allow the different implications of approaches to
knowledge in relation to stewardship goals to be responsibly thought through.Correspondence: kwhyte@msu.edu
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The concept of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK)
comes up frequently in certain segments of environmental
and natural resources science and policy literatures (Houde
2007). For some people, the term has come to refer to indi-
genous peoples’a legitimate systems of knowledge produc-
tion. Such systems have empirically tested (and testable)
understandings of the relationships among living things and
their environments, though there may be notable differ-
ences with scientific approaches characteristic of disciplines
like ecology or biology. The English language articulation of
TEK—along with synonymous or closely related terms like
indigenous knowledge (Brokensha et al. 1980) and native
science (Cajete 1999)—originates in literatures on inter-
national development (Agrawal 1995; Warren et al. 1995)
and adaptive management (Berkes 1999). It continues to
show up regularly in science conferences, like the 97th An-
nual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America in 2012,
which featured approximately 13 papers on TEK. It is also
found increasingly in the plans and policies of government
agencies, such as the Northwest Forest Plan (Harris 2011)
and the Natural Resources Conservation Service (Leonetti
2010) in the U.S., and international regimes such as the
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP 1998).
Examples of TEK in scientific and policy literatures are
diverse. They range from historical practices like the cre-
ation of forest islands for the production of fruit and at-
traction of game (Gadgil et al. 1993), to currently practiced
skill-based traditions like deer cleaning techniques em-
bodying community value systems (Reo and Whyte 2012),
to practical applications for natural resource management
and climate change like burning practices (Kimmerer and
Lake 2001) and observations of changes in water levels, sea
ice, lake processes, and the movements of animal popula-
tions (Voggesser 2010; Wildcat 2009; Nakashima et al.
2012; Eisner et al. 2009).
Yet TEK is often invoked in ways that are controversial.
There are three plausible reasons why this may be the
case. (1) TEK often refers to knowledge production sys-
tems whose value has been overlooked or disapproved of
by scientists and policy makers. Ignorance and disap-
proval are often tied to colonial, imperial, and other dis-
criminatory attitudes and institutions of science toward
“non-Western” knowledge systems (Harding 1998, 2011;
Salmon 1996). (2) Definitions of TEK are often formu-
lated by scholars or professionals who are not commu-
nity members and hence have tendencies to privilege
their own agendas for environmental and natural re-
sources stewardship and management (McGregor 2008;
Ellen 2000; Nadasdy 1999; Huntington 2000). (3) TEK is
perceived as being a competing authority with science,
creating divisions between indigenous expert authorities
and scientific expert authorities (Kofinas 2005; McGregor
2008).A good portion of this controversy revolves around a
tendency to want to determine one definition for TEK that
can satisfy every stakeholder in every context. Yet a scan
of environmental science and policy literatures reveals
there to be sufficiently large differences in definitions of
TEK that may obstruct the possibility of moving toward a
consensus on the best definition. These differences sug-
gest an alternative direction for philosophical reflection on
TEK. Perhaps what is important is not only defining TEK;
rather, what should be additionally explored is the role
that the concept of TEK plays in facilitating or discour-
aging cross-cultural and cross-situational collaboration
between indigenous and non-indigenous institutions such
as tribal natural resources departments, federal agencies
working with tribes, and co-management boards.
I argue that the concept of TEK should be understood
as a collaborative concept. It serves to invite diverse
populations to continually learn from one another about
how each approaches the very question of “knowledge”
in the first place, and how these different approaches
can work together to better steward and manage the en-
vironment and natural resources. Therefore, any under-
standing of the meaning of TEK is acceptable only so
long as it plays the role of bringing different people
working for different institutions closer to a degree of
mutual respect for one another’s sources of knowledge.
The implication is that environmental scientists and pol-
icy professionals, indigenous and non-indigenous, should
focus more on creating long term processes that allow
for the implications of different approaches to know-
ledge in relation to stewardship and management prior-
ities to be responsibly thought through.
The paper starts in the Methods section with a descrip-
tion of the philosophical method used to make the argu-
ment just mentioned. In the Results and Discussion
section, I cover some of the different assumptions that
make it hard for consensus to form on what TEK means.
The subsection “TEK and knowledge mobilization” de-
scribes assumptions about knowledge mobilization; the
subsection “The relation between TEK and science” de-
scribes assumptions about the relation between TEK and
disciplines like ecology or biology. The subsection “The
role of TEK as a collaborative concept” shows why TEK
should be considered as a collaborative concept that brid-
ges cross-cultural and cross-situational divides. The “Con-
clusions” section ends the paper with thoughts on the
implications for cooperative environmental and natural re-
sources stewardship and management. From now on, I will
refer to environmental and natural resource stewardship
and management as simply environmental governance.
Methods
This is a philosophical paper (written by an environmental
philosopher) that explores how the concept of TEK is
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it serves for improving cooperative environmental and
natural resources stewardship and management between
indigenous and non-indigenous institutions. The philo-
sophical method applied here is one that outlines numer-
ous possible meanings of a concept (TEK, in this paper)
and the implications of each meaning for science and pol-
icy. The argument about TEK as a collaborative concept
intends to spur greater reflective discussion among the
relevant audiences on the meaning of a concept that may
be controversial or simply taken for granted. This paper
attempts to complement the scientific papers in this spe-
cial issue of Ecological Processes.
Results and discussion
In science and policy literatures, there are different defini-
tions of TEK. Controversy can brew over TEK when
people hold definitions that are based on different as-
sumptions. There are two kinds of assumptions about the
meaning of TEK. The first kind refers to assumptions
about the mobilization of TEK, or what I call knowledge
mobilization. Knowledge mobilization refers to assump-
tions about what different types of knowledge can be used
for and their adaptability to suit different contexts. The
second kind involves assumptions about how to under-
stand the relationship between TEK and disciplines like
ecology or biology, or, in other words, the relation be-
tween TEK and science. The two kinds of assumptions
(knowledge mobilization; TEK and science) can generate
controversy because they imply differences about “whose”
definition of TEK gets privileged, who is counted as hav-
ing expert authority over environmental governance is-
sues, and how TEK should be factored into policy
processes that already have a role for disciplines like for-
estry or toxicology in them. The section “TEK and know-
ledge mobilization” begins to discuss these assumptions,
starting with knowledge mobilization. The section “The
relation between TEK and science” begins the discussion
on the second kind of assumption (the relation between
TEK and science).
TEK and knowledge mobilization
Some definitions see TEK as a basic body of knowledge.
According to Nakashima et al., TEK is “the knowledge
of Native people about their natural environment”
(Nakashima 1993, 99). This basic body of knowledge is
usually defined as having been gathered across genera-
tions: “Indigenous or traditional knowledge refers to
the knowledge and know-how accumulated across gen-
erations, and renewed by each new generation, which
guide human societies in their innumerable interactions
with their surrounding environment” (Nakashima et al.
2012, 8). Definitions like this emphasize TEK as a sub-
stantive body of knowledge that is created and storedby human societies to aid in their flourishing in the face
of environmental and natural resources challenges. The
time scale of this knowledge is many generations. In
this sense, TEK is taken as archival in nature. It is a
store of knowledge of the relationships between living
things and their environment.
A key assumption about knowledge mobilization in
this definition is that TEK is a supply of knowledge
ready to hand to be used by people in different contexts.
In the policy document, Weathering Uncertainty: Trad-
itional Knowledge for Climate Change Assessment and
Adaptation (United Nations), Nakashima et al. write that
such “community-based and local knowledge may offer
valuable insights into environmental change due to
climate change, and complement broader-scale scienti-
fic research with local precision and nuance” (2012,
6). They go on to state, as an example, that “Indigenous
observations and interpretations of meteorological phe-
nomena have guided seasonal and inter-annual activities
of local communities for millennia. This knowledge con-
tributes to climate science by offering observations and
interpretations at a much finer spatial scale with consid-
erable temporal depth and by highlighting elements that
may not be considered by climate scientists” (8). In this
example, TEK is a body of knowledge, or archive,
waiting to be picked up by climate science. TEK is con-
ceived as an archive that is continually updated or an
archive of a society that no longer exists, yet biologists
or ecologists can nonetheless find the knowledge and in-
corporate it into their research.
The assumption that TEK is a basic body of know-
ledge is often accompanied by the idea that elements of
a society’s worldview are an intimate dimension of its
TEK system. Berkes, for example, defines TEK as “a cu-
mulative body of knowledge, practice and belief, evolving
by adaptive processes and handed down through genera-
tions by cultural transmission, about the relationship of
living things (including humans) with one another and
with their environment” (Berkes 1999, 8; see also Gadgil
et al. 1993, 151). This definition situates TEK as a body
of “knowledge, practice and belief” inspired by a particu-
lar worldview and bioregion. It is interwoven with a
society’s cultural fabric. Here, TEK is not just an archive,
but a part of what members of a particular culture think,
believe and do. It is situated knowledge.
The definition of TEK as a situated body of knowledge is
found in policy documents. For example, the Natural Re-
sources Conservation Service (NRCS) published Indigen-
ous Stewardship Methods and NRCS, which aims to guide
NRCS staff to work better with tribes. TEK is seen as
bound up with “indigenous stewardship method,” which is
defined as the “ecologically sustainable use of natural re-
sources within their capacity to sustain natural processes.”
Indigenous stewardship method (ISM) is possibly a
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in which indigenous peoples acquired the knowledge
base over hundreds of years through direct experience
and contact with the environment. ISM is the
physical, spiritual, mental, emotional, and intuitive
relationship of indigenous peoples with all aspects and
elements of their environment.
These relationships include, but are not limited to, a
combination of knowledge, experience, tradition,
places, locality, all living and nonliving things, skills,
practices, theories, social strategies, moments,
spirituality, history, heritage, and more; and may not
be fully embraced by people who fail to understand all
those dimensions (Leonetti 2010, 13).
In this definition, TEK is considered a knowledge “base,”
or body of knowledge, though one embedded within mul-
tiple relationships among living beings, non-living things,
and the environment. The passage above also raises a
question concerning the degree that outsiders will be able
to respect or comprehend a TEK system. But the purpose
of the NRCS guide is to advance a set of best practices
and principles so that NRCS staff can begin to work with
communities for whom TEK forms a significant dimen-
sion of their lifeways.
An implication of definitions based on the assumption
that TEK is a body of knowledge is that TEK can be picked
up and used by scientists or agency staff. Each of the policy
documents just cited involves the idea that TEK can be
gleaned from the communities who have it, either through
historical research or working with actual communities,
and can then be incorporated into the environmental gov-
ernance of non-indigenous institutions like those of the
United Nations or U.S. Department of Agriculture. So the
assumption about knowledge mobilization is that TEK, no
matter what the society, is “something” that can be seen as
archival. With some effort, it can be interpreted for use in
different contexts, especially science policy contexts, that
is, contexts where there is a given role for scientific infor-
mation in environmental governance.
Some indigenous scientists, in particular, have offered
definitions of TEK that resist the assumption that it is
mainly a body of knowledge. McGregor, for example, ar-
gues that TEK involves the relationships between “know-
ledge, people, and all Creation (the ‘natural’ world as
well as the spiritual). . .TEK is viewed as the process of
participating (a verb) fully and responsibly in such rela-
tionships, rather than specifically as the knowledge
gained from such experiences. For Aboriginal people,
TEK is not just about understanding relationships, it is
the relationship with Creation. TEK is something one
does” (McGregor 2004a,b, 2008, 145). For McGregor,
TEK refers to the activities that people in indigenoussocieties are doing as part of their stewardship. It is not
archival or body-like. To speak of a society’s TEK is to
speak of ongoing activities expressive of responsibilities.
The ideas of “fully” and “responsibly” suggest what in
the field of philosophy is often called moral character or
just character. Character refers to the idea that acting re-
sponsibly (and hence ethically) is a matter of possessing
embodied traits like courage or respect that enable one
to know the right thing to do in particular situations and
to act in ways that maintain relations of balance within
one’s society. People who possess the character traits
also possess the internal motivation to do what is right.
Within a society’s system of responsibilities, character
refers to the particular traits that people acquire over
many years (since childhood) in order to express respon-
sibilities and balanced relationships in all that they do.
Definitions like McGregor’s see TEK systems as systems
of responsibilities that cannot be detached from the
character traits required to fulfill the moral demands of
these systems.
Other native scholars have also emphasized the re-
sponsibilities and character dimensions of TEK. Pierotti
and Wildcat see TEK as
. . . based in the knowledge that native societies existed
under conditions of constant pressure on the resources
upon which they depended, and that a means had to be
found to convince communities and families to
economize with regard to their use of natural
resources. . . The connections that are a crucial aspect
of TEK are based on a mixture of extraction, e.g.
animals are taken as prey, combined with recognition
of the inherent value and good of non-human lives.
Traditional knowledge is based on the premise that
humans should not view themselves as responsible for
nature, i.e., we are not stewards of the nature world, but
instead that we are a part of that world, no greater than
any other part. In this way TEK deals largely with
motivating humans to show respect for nonhumans
(Pierotti and Wildcat 2000, 1336).
Pierotti and Wildcat see motivation, an important as-
pect of character, as a key component of TEK. They
even suggest that terms like stewardship are not suffi-
cient for describing the actual intimacies involved in re-
lationships among living beings and non-living things on
which TEK systems are based. As with McGregor, TEK
is a doing, a full participation in a system of responsibil-
ities needed for a society’s flourishing. For both Pierotti
and Wildcat and McGregor, great emphasis is placed on
the idea that TEK is not knowledge about relationships
but is the complete participation in the responsibilities.
Similar definitions are found in the work of other indi-
genous scholars (Reo and Whyte 2012; Cajete 1999).
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arise from particular cosmological beliefs about the rela-
tionships between living beings and non-living things or
humans and the natural world. There is an important im-
plication for knowledge mobilization. TEK cannot be
readily transferred to different contexts unless the people
in the new context also learn the systems of responsibil-
ities and character traits. Such learning entails complete
cultural immersion. Thus, it could be problematic, on the
system of responsibility assumption, to see TEK as some-
thing that could be incorporated by, for example, climate
science. For climate science may not be used in a policy
context that seeks to integrate the system of responsibil-
ities of a particular indigenous people into its strategies
for environmental governance.
The body of knowledge assumption and the system of
responsibility assumption are different in important ways
to the degree that they underlie various definitions of TEK.
In terms of the former, TEK can be extracted from its soci-
ety and fit into policy-relevant science. The gist goes some-
thing like this: climate science, for example, already fits
within a particular policy context. This fit is not deter-
mined by indigenous peoples. That is, indigenous peoples
are not active participants in the majority of decisions of
governments, universities, and organizations about what
funding programs to create for climate science and for
selecting who should be on review panels. Moreover, TEK
is not taken to be tied, in any important ways, to particular
stewardship or management strategies. Insofar as climate
science, in sticking with the last example, fits into a par-
ticular kind of understanding of management or adapta-
tion, TEK is seen to contribute to that by being plugged
into structures of scientific inquiry. But definitions based
on the assumption that TEK is a system of responsibilities
suggest that for TEK to be genuinely included, the people
who participate fully in it must be at the table equally with
non-indigenous scientists and policy makers. TEK is not a
piece broken off of one of these strategies and applied to
another. TEK just is the living environmental governance
of indigenous peoples stemming directly from their cos-
mologies in relation to the environmental challenges they
have faced over many generations.
The difference between the two assumptions can en-
gender some difficulties in forming a consensus on the
definition of TEK in terms of knowledge mobilization.
One assumption seeks to fit TEK within established sci-
ence policy decision-making frameworks, whereas the
other seeks to change this framework in favor of greater
participation by indigenous peoples.
The relation between TEK and science
TEK is also defined in ways that are based on assumptions
about its relation to disciplines like forestry or climatology.
The kind of assumption active in these definitions involveshow TEK can be compared or contrasted to scientific dis-
ciplines (i.e., science). There are three assumptions cov-
ered in this subsection: (1) TEK and science should be
seen as separate knowledge production systems. This
distinction should never be collapsed. (2) TEK and science
should be seen as twins, or two knowledge-bearing
perspectives on the world that complement each other.
(3) There is no basis for distinguishing TEK, or Indigen-
ous knowledge, from science, and the term TEK or its
synonyms should not be used. In all three of these views,
there is a lot riding on how TEK and science are seen as
related to each other because there are implications for
what sorts of empirical authorities are deemed relevant
for environmental governance.
The first version of this kind of assumption is that
TEK and science are sufficiently different to warrant
maintaining separate definitions. Proponents of this view
believe that there are definite differences in the values
and aspirations of science and those of TEK systems.
El-Hani and Souza de Ferreira Bandeira exemplify this
view. They use the term “indigenous knowledge” instead
of TEK, though their use of this term is synonymous
with TEK because they are talking about indigenous peo-
ples’ knowledge of the natural world and the relation-
ships between living things and the environment.b They
see Western modern science as “the most powerful way
of producing naturalistic explanations of natural phe-
nomena.” Yet it is also the case that “there are plenty of
different accounts of the world [i.e. indigenous know-
ledge] which are also powerful in their own ways” (2008,
756). They see indigenous knowledge as part of this lat-
ter grouping: these other accounts “are producing expla-
nations about supernatural (or, maybe non-natural is a
better term) beings and phenomena that are useful to
several human cultures. And, in the face of natural phe-
nomena, they are producing explanations that appeal to
spiritual domains, going beyond naturalistic chains or
networks of events” (2008, 756). The key to this differ-
ence, then, is that indigenous knowledge usually involves
some account of non-natural beings whereas science al-
ways excludes these non-natural beings. This reflects
some of the ideas of the previous section, where TEK is
tied to spirituality.
To call something science, then, for El-Hani and Souza
de Ferreira Bandeira, certain standards must be met. For
example, science embodies values and skills such as
“technical precision, control, creative genius, and ex-
planatory power. . .” Quoting Siegel, they argue that sci-
ence and indigenous knowledge could only be the same
thing “if it could be cogently argued that some particular
‘ethnic’ science. . .offered compelling theories/predic-
tions/explanations of natural phenomena. Could an ani-
mistic ethnic theory of volcanic activity and lava
flow. . .provide the sort of explanation, prediction, grasp
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ables and unobservables, and depth of scientific under-
standing provided by Western science?” (El-Hani et al.
2008, 757; Siegel 1997, 100). According to this under-
standing, there are definite values and knowledge-
bearing capabilities of science that cannot be attributed
to indigenous knowledge of the environment.
Indigenous knowledge, while it may produce important
knowledge, does not do so in the ways that scientific disci-
plines do. This is, according to the authors, not a form of
discrimination: “Notice that we are not saying that the
way this community builds knowledge, the knowledge
built, or the criteria employed to appraise cognitive state-
ments are epistemically superior to any other body of ap-
proaches, ideas, statements, criteria. We are just saying
that they are different, and should be kept different, for
the sake of clarity about the nature of knowledge and the
nature of science” (El-Hani and Souza de Ferreira
Bandeira 2008, 758). In this assumption about indigenous
knowledge (or TEK) and science, there are definite cri-
teria, values, skills, and so on that science and TEK have,
but there is not a lot of crossover. So TEK’s supernatural
and social aspects, respectfully so, exclude the possibility
of the kind of rationality associated with science. More-
over, societies without computing capacities built into
their TEK systems cannot value quantitative research in
the same way that it is valued in natural sciences disci-
plines, nor can they engage in the same kind of research.
This first assumption, that TEK and science are funda-
mentally different, differs from the second assumption,
which sees the former and the latter as two complemen-
tary perspectives on the environment that stem from
complementary views on the world. The views are com-
plementary because there is both crossover as well as
gap filling. Kimmerer argues that
Traditional ecological knowledge refers to the
knowledge, practice, and belief concerning the
relationships of living beings to one another and to
the physical environment, which is held by peoples in
relatively nontechnical societies with a direct
dependence upon local resources. . . It is born of long
intimacy and attentiveness to a homeland and can
arise wherever people are materially and spiritually
integrated within their landscape. TEK is rational and
reliable knowledge that has been developed through
generations of intimate contact by native peoples with
their lands (Kimmerer 2002, 431).
TEK and science, for Kimmerer, can be seen as having a
complementary relation to each other. Indeed, TEK can be
seen as the “intellectual twin to science,” a term she bor-
rows from Deloria (433). Kimmerer claims that TEK exists
“in parallel to Western science” (433). She claims that “Bothknowledge systems yield detailed empirical information of
natural phenomena and relationships among ecosystem
components.” This can include “predictive power,” overlap-
ping biological information, “detailed empirical knowledge
of population biology, resource assessment and monitoring,
successional dynamics, patterns of fluctuation in climate
and resources, species interactions, ethnotaxonomy, sus-
tainable harvesting, and adaptive management and ma-
nipulation of disturbance regimes. . .” (Kimmerer 2002,
433). Yet TEK differs from science for Kimmerer in import-
ant ways:
TEK observations tend to be qualitative, and they
create a diachronic database, that is, a record of
observations from a single locale over a long time
period. The National Science Foundation, in its
support of the Long-Term Ecological Research
program, has validated the importance of such
continuous data. In TEK, the observers tend to be the
resource users themselves, for example, hunters,
fishers, and gatherers whose harvesting success is
inextricably linked to the quality and reliability of
their ecological observations. In contrast, scientific
observations made by a small group of professionals
tend to be quantitative and often represent synchronic
data or simultaneous observations from a wide range
of sites, which frequently lack the long-term
perspective of TEK. . . Western science is conducted
in academic culture in which nature is viewed strictly
objectively. . . TEK is woven into and is inseparable
from the social and spiritual contexts of the culture. . .
TEK may also extend its explanatory power beyond
the strictly empirical, where science cannot go. . . In
indigenous science, nature is subject, not object. . .
Embraced as an equal partner to the power of
Western science, TEK offers not only important
biological insights but a cultural framework for
environmental problem solving that incorporates
human values (Kimmerer 2002, 433–434).
Here, then, for Kimmerer, TEK and science are two paral-
lel, complementary perspectives on the environment and
natural resources. They go hand in hand. Different from
the first assumption, Kimmerer has no problem using con-
cepts like “prediction” or “rational” with respect to TEK,
nor stating straightforwardly that techniques in TEK sys-
tems fit well with and are valued by science. She also shows
that the influence of culture in TEK systems could be con-
sidered beneficial to science. Though she admits differ-
ences, they are not the stark differences that are maintained
in the first assumption. For Kimmerer, then, knowledge
production that fails to incorporate both TEK systems and
the relevant sciences would be missing key perspectives on
the world. Instead of saying that they are valuable in their
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that they are valuable together. Both knowledge production
systems can learn a great deal from each other.
A third assumption diverges, in general, from the first
two by desiring to dispense altogether with the pursuit
of defining differences and complementarities between
TEK systems and science. That is, in this assumption,
there is really no use in even talking theoretically about
a distinction between TEK and science because at the
end of the day they are faces of the same phenomena:
the pursuit of usable knowledge by human societies.
Agrawal, for example, argues that
The attempt to create distinctions in terms of
indigenous and western is potentially ridiculous. It
makes much more sense. . . to talk about multiple
domains and types of knowledges, with differing
logics and epistemologies. Somewhat contradictorily,
but inescapably so, the same knowledge can be
classified one way or the other depending on the
interests it serves, the purposes for which it is
harnessed, or the manner in which it is generated. . .
[A]nchored unavoidably in institutional origins and
moorings, knowledge can only be useful. But it is
useful to particular peoples. Specific strategies for
protecting, systematizing and disseminating
knowledge will differentially benefit different social
groups and individuals. The recognition of this simple
truism is obscured by the confounding labels of
indigenous and western. It is only when we move
away from the sterile dichotomy between indigenous
and western, when we begin to recognize intra-group
differentiation; and when we seek out bridges across
the constructed chasm between the traditional and
the scientific, that we will initiate a productive
dialogue to safeguard the interests of those who are
disadvantaged (Agrawal 1995, 433).
This third view, then, suggests that to use terms like in-
digenous knowledge or TEK or Western science obscures
several important points. First, TEK and science are all
value-laden knowledge systems. The literature in social
studies of science shows multiple ways in which science is
guided by particular values and even associated with spir-
ituality (Biagioli 1999; Turnbull 2000). Second, there is no
reason why the criteria and values attributed to various
sciences cannot also be those of various TEK systems.
Moreover, by “intra-group” differentiation, Agrawal points
out that there are few indigenous people who rely on a
single, homogenous TEK system; rather their knowledge
system has changed and they likely also rely on different
scientific disciplines as well. Examples of this abound, like
Gupta’s 1998 study of how rural farmers in India engage
in hybrid agricultural practices that mix Western scientificand traditional knowledge systems (Gupta 1998). Or
Watson-Verran and Turnbull discuss how Western sci-
ence is composed of heterogeneous elements (Watson-
Verran and Turnbull 1995).
Agrawal’s position is based on the idea that every society
has some sort of knowledge system, which may be a patch-
work of systems with multiple origins (e.g., European, indi-
genous). There is no such thing as a knowledge system
that is not guided by people’s interpretations of the chal-
lenges that they face. And interpretations are influenced by
worldviews. There is no such thing as a knowledge system
that is more neutral than any other. In the case of scientific
disciplines, values of objectivity are based on cosmological
assumptions about there being subjects and objects in the
world and which beings, entities, and phenomena fall
under one or the other. A science based on such assump-
tions may be of limited use to a society that does not carve
up reality in this way. But on the other hand, such a society
may have great use for this kind of information. Context is
key. Agrawal’s assumption speaks to the situation that
many indigenous peoples encounter in the world. They
need reliable information for the environmental govern-
ance challenges they face. And they are likely in the pos-
ition to draw from many sources of knowledge. What
knowledge they can use depends on how suitable different
forms of knowledge are for their purposes. Whether forms
of knowledge are indigenous or not does not really matter
in the end. Some indigenous peoples may be served per-
fectly well by disciplines like biology as the basis of their
environmental governance strategies. So the implication is
that terms like TEK or indigenous knowledge are not very
useful and may even waste our time. We should focus
more on figuring out what knowledge systems best serve
the needs of particular communities and how to realize
them in practice.
As with knowledge mobilization, the distinction be-
tween TEK and science does not generate many easy op-
tions for consensus on how to define the two in relation
to each other. First, the view that TEK and science must
be labeled as such, and kept distinct, misses the realities of
indigenous environmental governance today. There is no
reason why any so-called TEK system cannot embrace
similar empirical values that are found commonly in vari-
ous scientific disciplines. One who adopts this assumption
would perhaps have to consider dropping it were one to
concede that certain values and criteria are not exclusive
to science. So it would be tricky for one to accept certain
parts of both the first and second assumptions. Moreover,
contemporary tribal environmental governance involves
examples of institutions that are guided by TEK but that
use technologies and methods that originate from non-
tribal scientific disciplines (Woodard 2005). Even exam-
ples of practices like hunting show that TEK systems are
adaptive in their adoption of technologies (Reo and Whyte
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ation between TEK and science and technology because
TEK systems can incorporate scientific techniques. Advo-
cates of the third assumption, of course, would find it
fairly difficult to accept the first two assumptions because
they invoke a distinction between TEK and science too
readily. Agrawal’s conclusion is that the term TEK must
be dispensed with altogether, as must particularly loaded
conceptions of science. So the first assumption seeks to
maintain a rigid separation in definitions; the second as-
sumption seeks a definition that reveals complementarity;
the third assumption can be seen as desiring to dispense
with the business of the first two assumptions altogether.
It is somewhat hard to see people who hold any of these
three assumptions coming to a consensus definition. Com-
bined with differences regarding knowledge mobilization,
it is even harder to see there ever being a single definition
acceptable to all stakeholders. But I want to offer another,
fruitful approach to coming to an understanding of TEK
that can advance environmental governance even as we
discuss and disagree on the assumptions underlying vari-
ous definitions. My approach is different from Agrawal’s
insofar as I do not see the need to dispense with the term
TEK. While Agrawal comes close to my understanding of
the difficulties in defining TEK, he does not draw the only
possible conclusion from accepting the reality of these dif-
ficulties. The fact that a term is defined in ways that are
problematic and subject to deep differences does not entail
that it has no use. Rather, this fact motivates us to consider
whether the term, given all its potential definitions and
confusing dimensions, has a proper role to play in advan-
cing collaborative environmental governance. I turn to this
topic in the next subsection.
The role of TEK as a collaborative concept
This subsection shows why TEK should be considered as
a collaborative concept that bridges cross-cultural and
cross-situational divides. To make this case, the initial
pages of this section focus on the environmental govern-
ance situations in which many tribes are embedded, and I
use the term co-management as an example of this. I then
move on to define what a collaborative concept is and
how this relates to the discussion of TEK I have been
building so far in this paper. In this sense, the initial pages
of this section take a slight detour before returning to the
concept of TEK.
Regardless of how TEK can be defined, what is the role
of the concept of TEK, in the first place, in the world of
environmental governance? The world of environmental
governance, here, involves relations between environmen-
tal governance institutions associated with and responsible
to indigenous peoples, like tribal natural resources depart-
ments and those regulating indigenous hunting practices,
and governance institutions associated with states andsubnational units like the U.S. Forest Service and Environ-
ment Canada. All of these institutions have evolved ways
of doing things out of histories in which the very idea of
indigenous environmental governance was overtly and
subtly marginalized. Times are changing, and greater re-
spect is accorded to indigenous peoples through inter-
national, federal, and local law and policy. These changes
create opportunities for indigenous peoples to work col-
laboratively with non-indigenous peoples, instead of
against them or in secrecy from them (covertly). Indigen-
ous peoples can begin to build institutions of environmen-
tal governance that are integrated with non-indigenous
institutions in ways that benefit indigenous communities
and respect the stewardship goals of their worldviews.
But institution building of this kind is always a work in
progress because of cross-cultural and cross-situational di-
vides. Cross-cultural divides are simply the differences in
worldview, language, lifestyle, and so on that obtain be-
tween indigenous and non-indigenous populations. For
example, an indigenous people may see the goal of restor-
ing a native fish species as rekindling the relationship be-
tween that species and humans living in the region,
whereas a non-indigenous population may see restoration
of the same species as a matter of achieving certain popu-
lation numbers conducive to a recreational outcome like
increasing tourism in the region. Cross-cultural divides
can also have an intra-group dimension to them, as there
may be differences in beliefs about building relationships
with a species in an indigenous community and territory,
for example. Cross-situational divides are differences in
capacities for environmental governance. For example, an
indigenous people may have access to fewer financial re-
sources than the neighboring state or province, have lim-
ited political control over the entire region where its
members live, and have less representation in national
decision-making than representatives of the neighboring
state or province. Cross-cultural and cross-situational di-
vides make collaboration challenging. It may be hard for
federal institutions to incorporate indigenous people’s
goals within their policy frameworks. It may be frustrating
to work across institutions with different bureaucratic
capabilities.
Since the possibility of meaningful collaboration is a rela-
tively recent turn of events, there is yet to be perfect guid-
ance about how collaboration that bridges cross-cultural
and cross-situational divides ought to be done. There are
cases of success and cases of failure. And there is still a lot
to be learned regarding whether the lessons from cases of
success can simply be transferred over to other contexts.
Caught in this predicament, there are a host of concepts
that are being debated as concepts that facilitate or dis-
courage genuine collaboration. For example, the concept
of co-management has been used to suggest a possible
route to cooperative environmental and natural resources
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idea of joint political relationships between indigenous and
non-indigenous institutions that work together according
to standards of fairness to govern particular areas and
bkresources. Standards of fairness include norms like equal
representation and voting rights. The concept of co-
management is the basis of actual co-management boards
and committees that are composed of indigenous and non-
indigenous participants and that are responsible for man-
aging a fishery or forested area, or particular species, like a
caribou population. Indigenous and non-indigenous insti-
tutions often rely on the term co-management as part of a
shared language for bridging cross-cultural and cross-
situation divides. However, there is also dialogue on how
the concept of co-management can be taken the wrong
way and provide insufficient guidance for collaboration. It
is often argued that the concept co-management implies
that the nation-state’s (e.g., Canada, U.S.) vision for envir-
onmental governance is used to evaluate the collaborative
efforts between indigenous and non-indigenous institu-
tions. This is because the term “management” can connote
a non-indigenous view of the appropriate relationship
among humans, other living beings, and the environment.
This term can slant the meaning of co-management so that
non-indigenous participants in a co-management board,
for example, come in with expectations that their assump-
tions about “management” should be prioritized and may
not listen to their indigenous colleagues. The term, then,
can have the effect of silencing genuine negotiation of
cross-cultural and cross-situational differences.
Instead, the concept of co-existence is offered (McGregor
2004b), which suggests the importance of balancing indi-
genous and non-indigenous aspirations of governance into
the evaluation of collaboration. In this case, one might be
inclined to think cynically that it is all about labels. But
there is much more going on than preferences about labels.
We need to consider the role played by concepts like
co-management and co-existence in facilitating or discour-
aging collaboration. People who reject the concept of co-
management based on the contexts they are familiar with
see in it problematic assumptions about how indigenous
and non-indigenous institutions should work together.
Non-indigenous people may not see how the concept of
co-management might encourage these assumptions, even
though, perhaps, co-management is the preferred concept
in some contexts. Those who reject the concept of co-
management and wish to replace it with the concept of co-
existence are inviting non-indigenous people to learn more
about cross-cultural and cross-situational divides. This is
the role that concepts like co-management and co-
existence play. The concept of co-existence does not in it-
self contain enough meaning for non-indigenous persons
to suggest in advance exactly how a collaborative process
should play out. What proponents of co-existence aresaying is that there is much learning to do. The concept of
co-existence suggests a very different possibility for collab-
oration than what non-indigenous peoples may be used to.
Work on co-existence expresses an invitation to learn
about cross-cultural and cross-situational divides so as to
achieve better collaborations in particular contexts.
There are two important points here regarding the role
of these concepts. First, co-management and co-existence
are invoked, for better or worse, by many different institu-
tions in contexts where they are trying to collaborate
across cross-cultural and cross-situational divides. Second,
the example of co-existence I gave is an example of how
some people seek to use concepts to improve collaboration
by inviting people to consider alternatives that may not
have been on their conceptual radar before. The concept
of TEK and its synonyms plays a somewhat analogous role
to the term co-existence. As in the first point, various defi-
nitions of TEK are used in collaborative contexts, for better
or worse. As in the second point, those who bring new def-
initions of TEK into dialogue are inviting others to con-
sider new possibilities for thinking about the function of
knowledge systems in environmental governance.
However, we need to be precise about what this means—
because I am not arguing that there is a single definition of
TEK that can count for all. This is impossible. TEK, no
matter how it is defined, is not adequate for any indigenous
community. The English articulation, TEK, is not an indi-
genous word or concept, and it is likely not used within
very many communities unto themselves. The terms trad-
itional and ecological are awkward. Traditional can have
the effect of putting knowledge in the past, whereas TEK is
often supposed to mean contemporary knowledge. Eco-
logical aligns TEK with a particular discipline, whereas TEK
refers to knowledge that does not stem from that discipline.
Terms like indigenous knowledge and native science are
similarly awkward when we unpack what associations and
dissociations they may imply. Moreover, there may be many
contexts where an indigenous people does see the concept
as referring to accumulated observations, for example, or
contexts where TEK is viewed as a Western construct ir-
relevant to environmental governance. There are likely
other contexts where TEK needs to refer to systems of re-
sponsibilities. There are multiple possible scenarios. The
concept of TEK cannot possibly do justice to the know-
ledge systems and articulations of knowledge systems be-
longing to the thousands of indigenous peoples. TEK is also
not a concept that was an integral part of the education of
most ecologists or foresters, nor is it a concept that has
existed for a long time in the federal policies of a nation-
state. This does not mean, though, that the concept should
be dispensed with. Non-indigenous peoples may be equally
uncomfortable with referring to something they are not fa-
miliar with as science or linked with a particular scientific
discipline. It may be no easier for them to change out terms
Whyte Ecological Processes 2013, 2:7 Page 10 of 12
http://www.ecologicalprocesses.com/content/2/1/7like TEK with even more general terms like Agrawal’s “us-
able knowledge.”d
Thus, whenever the concept of TEK is invoked, the role
that it plays is to suggest that indigenous communities
may approach the very question of the nature of know-
ledge and how it relates to environmental and natural re-
source governance rather differently than disciplines like
ecology or biology and the policy contexts in which they
are used. By, “rather differently,” I do not mean in some
sense that applies to all communities. For example, there
may be some indigenous communities that invoke TEK to
mean a radically different cultural paradigm, one in which
it is not appropriate to speak of knowledge as distinct from
practice or belief. But other indigenous communities who
live in different regions because of historical removal may
invoke TEK to stand for the values that they believe disci-
plines like ecology should serve, even if they lack intimate
experiences with the environment they currently inhabit.
Yet other communities might use TEK to suggest different
ways in which multiple empirical techniques for gathering
knowledge, from hunters’ observations to scientific field
methods, can be used in harmony. TEK could also refer to
ideas about how elders should be involved in the design
and peer review of research in tribal environmental de-
partments that collect their own data about the environ-
ment and the condition of natural resources. There are
many more scenarios, of course. These scenarios indicate
the diversity of how people, at a philosophical level, think
about the meaning of knowledge in relation to their lives.
And their thinking arises from multiple cultural, historical,
global, social, and personal sources.
The significance of this point is that when the concept
of TEK is used, it really points to the possibility that
there are cross-cultural and cross-situational divides that
make it so that non-indigenous parties cannot expect
their own assumptions to apply to indigenous contexts.
The concept of TEK should be invoked to invite non-
indigenous parties to learn more about how particular
indigenous communities approach fundamental ques-
tions of the nature of knowledge and how it fits into
their visions of environmental governance. This invita-
tion is not one that promises easy answers. Rather, it is
an invitation to become a part of a long term process
whereby cross-cultural and cross-situation divides are
better bridged through mutual respect and learning, and
relationships among collaborators are given the oppor-
tunity to mature. Examples of long term processes in-
clude “the way of peace” used among indigenous and
non-indigenous participants in the Ontario Model Forest
(Holmes et al. 2002; Story and Lickers 1997). There are
many other examples. We need not only be concerned
with striking the right definition of TEK. Rather, we need
to cultivate attitudes of awareness that the concept of
TEK plays a role as a collaborative concept, which iswhat I call a concept that invites people to engage in a
process of respectful learning about significant differ-
ences.e
Conclusions
TEK and its synonyms indigenous knowledge and native
science have been defined mainly based on two kinds of
assumptions: how knowledge is to be mobilized and what
TEK’s relation to science is. The different assumptions
make it tricky to come to a consensus definition that satis-
fies all stakeholders. This makes us interrogate what the
role of TEK is in a world of relationships among different
institutions of environmental governance for whom TEK
is an issue. TEK must play the role of inviting cross-
cultural and cross-situational learning for indigenous and
non-indigenous policy makers, natural resource managers,
scientists, activists, elders, and youth.
An important implication of this is that science and
policy literatures that invoke TEK should discuss it as a
collaborative concept. That is, care must be taken to
show that the concept invites participation to a long
term process of mutually respectful learning. And more
effort needs to be taken to understand what these pro-
cesses should look like. Already, of course, there is work
that exemplifies this interpretation of TEK (Barnhardt
2005; Ross et al. 2010). Yet the point has not been
brought out that TEK is playing the role of a collabora-
tive concept in this work. This point should figure more
in natural resources and policy literatures. Differences
over the meaning of TEK should be seen as invitations
to learn more in circumstances where the possibility of
genuine collaboration is a relatively recent development.
Endnotes
aIndigenous peoples refer to the pre-invasion inhabi-
tants of lands now dominated by others, examples being
the Maori in New Zealand or the Anishinaabe in the
United States and Canada (Anaya 2004).
bI will use the term indigenous knowledge specifically
when I refer to the work of these authors and shift back
to the term TEK for my own analysis. My analysis of
Agrawal, later on in the same section, will also use indi-
genous knowledge when referring specifically to his
work and TEK when referring to my own analysis.
cOther collaborative literature includes Fortmann 2008
and Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2008.
dAgrawal too has considered the role of the concept of
TEK in cross-cultural and cross-situational collabor-
ation. He argues that
. . .it is possibly the case that advocates of indigenous
knowledge find in the term a particularly potent way
to summarize and invoke many of their concerns and
hopes about peoples, livelihoods, life styles, and
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phrase evokes embattled ways of living-in-the-world
that real economic, social and political pressures are
nudging and frog-marching toward further
marginalization and oblivion. Because the indigenous/
scientific division of knowledge effectively represents
durable underlying social confrontations, the study
and defense of indigenous knowledge continues to
attract attention. Indeed, even as one questions the
need to contrast indigenous and scientific
knowledges, one underscores this contrast—in the
very use of the contrasting adjectives. Indigenous
knowledge is here to stay, even if what it represents is
forever and always disappearing (Agrawal 2009, 158).
I hope to articulate in this paper that there are far
more reasons why people invoke concepts like TEK or
indigenous knowledge than what Agrawal states.
eCollaborative concepts also differ from boundary ob-
jects (Star and Griesemer 1989). Boundary objects are
commonly shared by diverse stakeholders and serve to
coordinate their actions despite different interests. Col-
laborative concepts are invitations to learn more, which
suggest the need for a long term process of mutually re-
spectful learning.
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